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Abstract
Although various limits on the predicability of physical phenomena as
well as on physical knowables are commonly established and accepted, we
challenge their ultimate validity. More precisely, we claim that fundamen-
tal limits arise only from our limited imagination and fantasy. To illus-
trate this thesis we give evidence that the well-known Turing incomputabil-
ity barrier can be trespassed via quantum indeterminacy. From this algo-
rithmic viewpoint, the “fine tuning” of physical phenomena amounts to a
“(re)programming” of the universe.
Take a few moments for some anecdotal recollections. Nuclear science has
made true the ancient alchemic dream of producing gold from other elements such
as mercury through nuclear reactions. A century ago, similar claims would have
disqualified anybody presenting them as quack. Medical chemistry discovered an-
tibiotics which cure Bubonic plague, tuberculosis, syphilis, bacterial pneumonia,
as well as a wide range of bacterial infectious diseases which were considered
untreatable only one hundred years ago. For contemporaries it is hard to imagine
the kind of isolation, scarcity in international communication, entertainment and
transportation most of our ancestors had to cope with.
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This historic anecdotal evidence suggests that what is considered tractable,
operational and feasible depends on time. One could even extend speculations to
the point where everything that is imaginable is also feasible. In what follows,
we shall concentrate on some physical issues which might turn out to become
relevant in the no–so–distant future, and which might affect the life of the gener-
ations succeeding ours to a considerable degree. In particular, we shall consider
the connections between time, space and the limit velocity of light in vacuum;
we shall ponder upon measurement; and we shall discuss physical indetermin-
ism and randomness, and its relations to the possibility of trespassing the Turing
incomputability barrier.
1 Space-time
One of the findings of special relativity theory is the impossibility to trespass the
speed of light barrier “from below;” i.e., by starting out with subluminal speed.
This fundamental limit applies also to communication and information transfer.
Amazingly, this holds true even when quantum mechanics and “nonlocal quan-
tum correlations” are taken into account, stimulating a notion of “peaceful co-
existence” between quantum mechanics and special relativity theory. Thereby,
superluminal particles, as well as the inclusion of field theoretic effects such as
an index of refraction smaller than unity, supercavitation in the quantum ether, or
general relativistic effects by locally rotating masses, wormholes or local contrac-
tion and expansion of space-time, possibly also related to time travel, to name but
a few, cannot be excluded a priory.
Recent operational definitions of space-time and velocity, in order to physi-
cally represent the former, conventionalised the latter: Initially, the constancy of
the velocity of light in vacuum in all reference frames was treated as an empirical
fact. Since 1983 it has been frame-invariantly standardised by Resolution Number
1 of the 17th Confe´rence Ge´ne´rale des Poids et Mesures (CGPM) in which the fol-
lowing SI (International System of Units) operational definition of the meter has
been adopted: “The metre is the length of the path travelled by light in vacuum
during a time interval of 1/299 792 458 of a second.” As a result, the empirical
fact associated with this convention, as predicted by relativity theory, is the propo-
sition that the length of a solid body depends neither on its spatial orientation, nor
on the inertial frame relative to which that body is at rest [1].
Indeed, by a theorem of incidence geometry [2], linear Lorenz-type trans-
formations follow from the frame-invariant standardisation of the velocity of light
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alone and appear to be a formal consequence of the conventions adopted by the SI.
In such an approach, the physics resides in the invariance of Maxwell’s equations
and the equations of motion in general, as well as in the invariance of all physical
measures based on matter stabilised by them, such as the length or duration of
a space or time scale. This, after all, suits the spirit of Einstein’s original 1905
paper, which starts out with conventions defining simultaneity and then proceeds
with kinematics and by unifying electric and magnetic phenomena. Of course, for
the sake of principle, everybody is free to choose other “limiting speeds,” thereby
implicitly sacrificing the form invariant representation of the equations of motion
in inertial frames dominated and stabilised by electromagnetic interactions. In this
way it would also not be difficult to adopt special relativity to findings of higher
signalling and travel speeds than the velocity of light in vacuum.
Since antiquity, natural philosophers and scientists have pondered about
the (in)finite divisibility of space-time, about its (dis)continuity, and about the
(im)possibility of motion. In more recent times, the ancient Eleatic arguments
ascribed to Parmenides and Zeno of Elea have been revived to “construct” ac-
celerated computations [3] which serve as one of the main paradigms of the fast
growing field of hypercomputation.
The most famous argument ascribed to Zeno is the impossibility for “Achilles”
to overtake a turtle if the turtle is granted to start some finite distance ahead
of Achilles, even though the turtle moves, say, one hundred times slower than
Achilles: for in the finite time it takes Achilles to reach the turtle’s start position,
it has already moved away from it and is still a (tenth of the original) finite distance
apart from Achilles. Now, if Achilles tries to reach that new point in space, the
turtle has made its way to another point and is still apart from Achilles. Achilles’
vain attempts to reach and overtake the turtle could be considered ad infinitum;
with him coming ever closer to the turtle but never reaching it. By a similar argu-
ment, there could not be any motion, because in order to move from one spatial
point to another, one would have first to cross half-distance; and in order to be
able to do this, the half-distance of the half-distance, . . . again ad infinitum. It
might seem that because of the infinite divisibility of space, unrestricted motion
within it is illusory because of this impossibility.
The modern-day “solution” of this seemingly impossible endeavour to move
ahead of a slower object resides in the fact that it takes Achilles an ever decreasing
outer (extrinsic, exterior) time to reach the turtle’s previous position; so that if one
takes “the limit” by summing up all infinitely many outer space and time intervals,
Achilles meets (and overtakes) the turtle in finite outer time, thereby approaching
an infinity of space-time points. Of course, Achilles’ approach is even then mod-
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elled by an infinite number of steps or trip segments, which can be used to create
an inner (intrinsic) discrete temporal counter. If this inner counter could in some
form be associated with the cycle of an otherwise conventional universal com-
puter such as a universal Turing machine or a universal cellular automaton [4, 5],
then these “machines” might provide “oracles” for “infinite computations.” In this
respect, the physics of space and time, and computer science intertwine.
The accelerated Turing machine (sometimes called Zeno machine) is a Turing
machine working in a computational space analogue to Zeno’s scenario. More
precisely, an accelerated Turing machine is a Turing machine that operates in a
universe with two clocks: for the exterior clock each step is executed in a unit of
time (we assume that steps are in some sense identical except for the time taken
for their execution) while for the inner clock it takes an ever decreasing amount of
time, say 2−n seconds, to perform its nth step. Accelerated Turing machines have
been implicitly described by Blake [6, p. 651] as well as Weyl [3, pp. 41-42], and
studied in many papers and books since then.
Because an accelerated Turing machine can run an infinite number of steps
(as measured by the exterior clock) in one unit of time (according to the inner
clock), such a mechanism may compute incomputable functions, for example, the
characteristic function of the halting problem.
How feasible are these types of computation? This is not an easy question,
so not surprisingly there is no definitive answer. One way to look at this ques-
tion is to study the relation between computational time and space. As expected,
there is a similarity between computational time and space; however, this paral-
lel is not perfect. For example, it is not true that an accelerated Turing machine
which uses unbounded space has to use an infinite space for some input. An ac-
celerated Turing machine that uses a finite space (not necessarily bounded) for all
inputs computes a computable function (the function is not necessarily computed
by the same machine) [7]. Hence, if an accelerated Turing machine computes an
incomputable function, then the machine has to use an infinite set of configura-
tions for infinitely many inputs. Re-phrasing, going beyond Turing barrier with an
accelerated Turing machine requires an infinite computational space (even if the
computational time is finite); the computational space can be bounded (embedded
in the unit interval), but cannot be made finite. Do we have such a space? Maybe
relativistic computation offers a physical model for hypercomputation [8].
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2 Measurement
Another challenging question has emerged in the quantum mechanical context but
it equally applies for all reversible systems: what is an irreversible measurement?
Because if the quantum evolution is uniformly unitary and thus strictly reversible,
what is to be considered the separated “measurement object” and the “measure-
ment apparatus” can be “wrapped together” in a bigger system containing both,
together with the “Cartesian cut;” i.e., the environment supporting communication
between these two entities. Any such bigger system is then uniformly describable
by quantum mechanics, resulting in total reversibility of whatever might be con-
sidered intrinsically and subjectively as a “measurement.” This in turn results in
the principal impossibility of any irreversible measurement (not ruling out deco-
herence “fapp;” i.e., for all practical purposes); associated with the possibility to
“reconstruct” a physical state prior to measurement; and to “undo” the measure-
ment [9]. The quantum state behaves just as in Schro¨dinger’s interpretation of
the Ψ function as a catalogue of expectation values: this catalogue can only be
“opened and read” at a single page; yet it may be “closed” again by “using up” all
knowledge obtained so far, and then reopened at another page.
Two related types of unknowables which have emerged in the quantum context
are complementarity and value indefiniteness. Complementarity is the impossibil-
ity to measure two or more observables instantaneously with arbitrary accuracy:
in the extreme case, measurement of one observable annihilates the possibility
to measure another observable, and vice versa. Despite attempts to reduce this
feature to a “completable” incompleteness by Einstein and others, and thus to pre-
liminary, epistemological deficiencies of the quantum formalism, the hypothetical
“quantum veil,” possibly hiding the “physical existence” of the multitude of all
conceivable (complementary) observables, has maintained its impermeability un-
til today.
As new evidence emerged, the lack of classical comprehensibility has gotten
even worse: whereas quasi-classical systems—such as generalised urn or finite
automaton models [10]—feature complementarity, some quantised systems with
more than two measurement outcomes cannot be thought of as possessing any
global “truth function.” As the Kochen-Specker theorem [11, 12] shows, they are
value indefinite in the sense that there exist (even finite) sets of observables which,
under the hypothesis of non-contextuality, cannot all (for some this might still be
possible) have definite values independent of the type of measurement actually
being performed.
Faced with the formal results, some researchers prefer a resolution in terms
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of contextual realism: measurement values “exist” irrespective of their “actual
measurement,” but they depend on what other observables are measured along-
side of them. Another possibility is to abandon classical omniscience and assume
that an “elementary” quantum system is only capable of expressing a single bit
(or dit for d potential measurement outcomes) [13] or context; all other conceiv-
able measurements are mediated by a measurement apparatus capable of context
translation.
3 Indeterminacy and hypercomputability
In the Pythagorean tradition, the universe computes. Thus any method and mea-
sure to change its behaviour amounts to (re)programming. If one remains within
this metaphor, the character and “plasticity” of the “substratum” software and
hardware needs to be exploited. Presently, the Church-Turing thesis confines the
universe to universal computability formalised by recursion theory, but is it con-
ceivable that some physical processes transcend this realm?
Arguably, the most (in)famous result in theoretical computer science is Tur-
ing’s theorem saying that it is undecidable to determine whether a general com-
puter program will halt or not. This is formally known as the halting problem.
More precisely, there is no computer program halt which given as input an ar-
bitrary program p runs a finite-time computation and returns 1 if p eventually
stops and 0 if p never stops (here we use a fixed universal Turing machine to run
programs).
There are two essential conditions imposed on halt: a) halt has to stop on
every input, b) halt returns the correct answer. It is easy to construct a program
halt that satisfies the above two conditions for many very, very large sets of
programs, even for infinite sets of programs, but not, as Turing proved, for all
programs.
So, one way to trespass the Turing barrier is to provide a a physical mechanism
which computes the function halt discussed above. There are many proposals
for such devices.. Let’s first present a negative result: using an information-
theoretic argument, the possibility of having access to a time-travel machine
would not solve the halting problem, unless one could travel back and forth in
time at a pace exceeding the growth of any computable function.
Would some quantum processes transcend the Turing barrier? Surprisingly,
the answer is yes [14], and the main reason is the incomputability of quantum
randomness.
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In 1926, Max Born stated that (cf. [15, p. 866], English translation in [16,
p. 54])
“From the standpoint of our quantum mechanics, there is no quantity
which in any individual case causally fixes the consequence of the
collision; but also experimentally we have so far no reason to believe
that there are some inner properties of the atom which condition a
definite outcome for the collision. Ought we to hope later to discover
such properties [[. . .]] and determine them in individual cases? Or
ought we to believe that the agreement of theory and experiment — as
to the impossibility of prescribing conditions? I myself am inclined to
give up determinism in the world of atoms.”
Born’s departure from the principle of sufficient reason — stating that every
phenomenon has its explanation and cause — by postulating irreducible random-
ness [17] in the physical sciences did not specify formally the type of “indeter-
minism” involved. More recent findings related to the Boole-Bell, Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger as well as Kochen-Specker theorems for Hilbert spaces of dimen-
sion three onwards derive physical indeterminism from value indefiniteness of at
least one observable among finite complementary collections of observables. As a
result, although not necessarily all noncontextual observables in Kochen-Specker-
constructions need to be value indefinite, but at least one has to be.
Suppose that quantum value indefiniteness occurs uniformly and symmetri-
cally distributed over all observables. Because indeterminism and randomness
are defined by algorithmic “lawlessness” and “incompressibility” [18] any phys-
ical system featuring indeterminism and randomness cannot be simulated by a
universal computer; it “outperforms” any known computing machinery in terms
of unpredictability. With these assumptions, physical value indefiniteness and
randomness can thus be seen as valuable resources capable of serving as “ora-
cles” for example, for Monte Carlo methods and primality testing requiring them.
Indeterminism becomes an asset rather than a deficiency.
Contemporary realisations of quantum random number generators involve
beam splitters. Thereby it should be noted that lossless beam splitters are re-
versible devices formalised by unitary transformations, and that the single pho-
tons used constitute a two-dimensional Hilbert space which may be “protected”
from cryptanalytic attacks “lifting the hypothetic quantum veil” by quantum com-
plementarity only. Indeed, it may not be totally unreasonable to point out that
one of the greatest and mind-boggling quantum riddles of our time is the rather
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ambivalent use of beam splitters: on the one hand, beam splitters are associated
with random coin tosses, which ase postulated to yield absolute and irreducible
randomness [17]; while on the other hand beam splitters are represented by di-
crete reversible unitary operators; the action of which could be totally reversed by
serially composing two of them into a Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
Imperfections in measurements are typically corrected with von Neumann’s
procedure of normalisation — “compressing” a bit sequence via the map 00,11 7→
{} (00 and 11 are discarded), 01 7→ 0, and 10 7→ 1. The algorithm works under the
hypotheses of independence and stationarity of the original sequence, conditions
which may not be satisfied in beam splitting experiments—for instance due to
multiparticle statistics like the Hanbury Brown and Twiss effect.
Some quantum systems are protected by value indefiniteness grounded in the
Kochen-Specker theorem from Hilbert space dimensions three onwards. As the
Kochen-Specker theorem requires complementarity, but the converse implication
is not true, it follows that a system of two entangled photons in a singlet state
or systems with three or more measurement outcomes may be more suitable for
generating quantum random bits. Obtaining more than two outcomes is not prob-
lematic as, if in a sequence of random elements drawn from an alphabet with n> 2
symbols a fixed symbol is systematically removed, the resulting sequence is still
random (over an alphabet of n−1 symbols).
Final remarks
There are exciting times ahead of us. The limits which seem to be imposed upon
us by various constraints might decay into “thin air” as the conditions upon which
these constraints are founded will lose their applicability and necessity, or even
lose their operational validity. Thus, we perceive physical tractability and feasi-
bility wide open, positive, and full of unexpected opportunities. Indeed, we just
quiver at the extension of our imaginable ignorance; let alone the possibilities
which we even lack to fantasise. Any further scientific exploration of this realm
has to be strongly encouraged.
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